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RESTITUTIONARY RELIEF UNDER ILLEGAL
CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA
Illegal Coniracts Defined'
Illegal contracts fall conveniently into three categories:
2
(1) A contract is illegal where the performance or part of the
performance3 of either or both parties is unlawful, because it is con-
trary to express law,4 public policy,5 or good morals.(
(2) A contract is illegal where the ultimate purpose7 or one of
several purposes 8 of the bargain is unlawful, because it is contrary
1 See generally CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1596, 1607, 1667, 1668; City of Los
Angeles v. City Bank, 100 Cal. 18, 34 P. 510 (1893) (distinguishes illegal con-
tracts from other void contracts); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 512-97
(1932).
2 See Hunter v. McKenzie, 197 Cal. 176, 239 P. 1090 (1925) (dictum).
3 CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1607, 1608, 1667; e.g., Haas v. Greenwald, 196 Cal.
236, 237 P. 38 (1925) (holding contract illegal where one of three real estate
agents performing the contract was unlicensed); Moffatt v. Bulson, 96 Cal. 106,
30 P. 1022 (1892) (contract to sell two tracts of land, one of which could not
be sold lawfully); Bierman v. Hagstrom Constr. Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 771, 1
Cal. Rptr. 826 (1959) (plaintiff unlicensed for 5 weeks of a performance last-
ing 10 months); Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal. App. 2d 332, 67 P.2d 114 (1937)
(action by general building contractor to establish mechanic's lien, where one
subcontractor was unlicensed).
4 E.g., Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal. 2d 628, 204 P.2d 37
(1949) (unlawful performance because plaintiff was unlicensed); Fewel &
Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal. 2d 85, 109 P.2d 650 (1941) (unlawful perform-
ance because plaintiff's assignor was unlicensed); Cain v. Burns, 131 Cal. App.
2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955) (unlawful promise by attorney to split fees).
5 E.g., Moss v. Moss, 20 Cal. 2d 640, 128 P.2d 526 (1942) (property set-
tlement conditioned upon wife's obtaining divorce); Merrill v. Peaslee, 146
Mass. 460, 16 N.E. 271 (1888) (promissory note given in exchange for wife's
promise to render conjugal consortium).
"It is primarily the prerogative of the legislature to declare what con-
tracts and acts shall be unlawful; but courts, following the spirit and genius
of the law, written and unwritten, of a state, may declare void as against
public policy contracts, which, though not in terms specifically forbidden by
legislation, are clearly injurious to the interests of society." Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 71 Cal. App. 492, 497, 236 P. 210, 212 (1925).
6 Glos v. McBride, 47 Cal. App. 688, 191 P. 67 (1920) (promise by plain-
tiff to cohabit with defendant as part of consideration for execution of lease).
7 E.g., Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561, 177 P.2d 4
(1947) (to defraud present and future creditors); Chateau v. Singla, 114 Cal.
91, 45 P. 1015 (1896) (to rent apartments to prostitutes).
s E.g., Teachout v. Bogy, 175 Cal. 481, 166 P. 319 (1917) (to assign liquor
license unlawfully to lessee); Shephard v. Lerner, 182 Cal. App. 2d 746, 6
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960) (to maintain leased premises contrary to city health and
safety ordinances).
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to express law,9 public policy,10 or good morals.1
(3) Some contracts are specifically made illegal by statute.=
General Rule of Unenforceabiliy 
13
When the plaintiff sues upon an illegal contract or demands
restitution of an enrichment the defendant gained through an ille-
gal transaction, the court is faced with a dilemma. As between the
parties, the plaintiff's claim may be well-founded, and his right to
recover indisputable.14 On the other hand, the public interest de-
mands that illegal transactions be discouraged, and it is believed that
denial of relief to both parties will tend to accomplish that purpose. 5
To solve the dilemma, the protection of the public is deemed a higher
interest than doing justice between the parties.16 Consequently, if
the court finds illegality in the bargain, the contract is held void, and
no claims arising out of the transaction will be enforced, either in
9 E.g., Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 206 Cal. 782, 276 P. 345 (1929) (buying
land for person who could not lawfully buy it under Alien Land Law); Bank
of Orland v. Harlan, 188 Cal. 413, 206 P. 75 (1922) (where the purpose was
to mislead a bank examiner as to the assets of the bank); Chateau v. Singla,
114 Cal. 91, 45 P. 1015 (1896) (sole activity of partnership was in contraven-
tion of a criminal statute).
10 E.g., Contractor's Safety Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48
Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957) (dividend agreement, collateral to insurance
policy, intended to reduce indirectly the premium rate); McAllister v.
Drapeau, 14 Cal. 2d 102, 92 P.2d 911 (1939) (promissory note demanded by
defendant bank before agreeing to refund plaintiff's debt under the Home
Owner's Loan Act of 1933); People ex rel. Mosk v. Barenfeld, 203 Cal. App.
2d 166, 21 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962) (defrauding state government). See quota-
tion in note 5 supra.
11 Abbe v. Marr, 14 Cal. 210 (1859) (intending to win otherwise lawful
wagering contract by "fixing" horse race).
An unlawful performance or purpose, however, which is remotely and
collaterally connected with the contract out of which the plaintiff's claim
arose will not render that contract illegal. Boloyan v. Contente, 113 Cal. App.
2d 439, 248 P.2d 96 (1952); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 597 (1932).
12 E.g., Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949)
(conditional sales contract the contents of which did not meet statutory
requirements); Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956
(1927) (usurious lending agreement); Kings Laboratories, Inc. v. Yucaipa
Valley Fruit Co., 18 Cal. App. 2d 47, 62 P.2d 1054 (1936) (contract price for
storage above statutory maximum).
'3 See generally CALr. Cwv. CODE §§ 1598, 1599, 1608; RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 598 (1932).
14 See, e.g., Bierman v. Hagstrom Constr. Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 771, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (1959); Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954);
Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal. App. 2d 332, 67 P.2d 114 (1937).
15 Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
If the parties know that they must rely solely upon each other and cannot
secure the aid of a court to enforce their claims, they are less likely to make
the illegal contract. Id. at 150, 308 P.2d at 719.
16 Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 206 Cal. 782, 276 P. 345 (1929). "This rule is
not generally applied to secure justice between the parties who have made
the illegal contract, but from regard for a higher interest-that of the public,
whose welfare demands that certain transactions be discouraged." Id. at 786-
87, 276 P. at 346.
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law or in equity.'7 The court leaves the parties precisely where it
finds them:'18 the contract will not be enforced by specific relief or
damages,19 nor will either party be allowed to rescind and recover
in restitution,20 even though the defendant may thereby remain un-
justly enriched.
21
When an action is brought, the defendant can plead the illegality
as a complete defense.22 The doctrines of ratification, estoppel, and
laches will not bar this defense,23 nor does the parol evidence rule
prevent proof of unlawful purposes or acts not appearing in the lan-
guage of a written agreement.24 Furthermore, if at any time during
the litigation the illegality comes to the attention of the court, the
17 E.g., Chateau v. Singla, 114 Cal. 91, 45 P. 1015 (1896) (suit in equity
for dissolution of an illegal partnership); Shephard v. Lerner, 182 Cal. App.
2d 746, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960) (suit in equity for cancellation of an illegal
lease); Fong v. Miller, 105 Cal. App. 2d 411, 233 P.2d 606 (1951) (action at
law for the value of improvements made on defendant's property).
18 E.g., Bank of Orland v. Harlan, 188 Cal. 413, 206 P. 75 (1922), where
the plaintiff bank was refused recovery on promissory notes, and the defend-
ant maker of the notes was refused enforcement of the plaintiff's promise to
return them, because the purpose of the transaction was unlawfully to mis-
lead a bank examiner; Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688
(1947), where the court refused both partners' prayers for an accounting after
termination of an illegal partnership agreement.
19 E.g., Moffatt v. Bulson, 96 Cal. 106, 30 P. 1022 (1892) (foreclosure
suit); Kings Laboratories, Inc. v. Yucaipa Valley Fruit Co., 18 Cal. App. 2d
47, 62 P.2d 1054 (1936) (action for sale price, and counterclaim for damages).
20 E.g., Lee On v. Long, 37 Cal. 2d 499, 234 P.2d 9 (1951) (action to re-
cover money confiscated in gambling raid by police); Miller v. California
Roofing Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 136, 130 P.2d 740 (1942) (suit to rescind illegal
contract and for restitution of consideration paid).
21 E.g., Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 206 Cal. 782, 276 P. 345 (1929) (suit to
compel restitution of a deposit made under an illegal contract to sell land);
Fong v. Miller, 105 Cal. App. 2d 411, 233 P.2d 606 (1951) (suit for the rea-
sonable value of improvements made on defendant's land under an illegal
lease).
22 Contractor's Safety Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal.
2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957); Davis v. Chipman, 210 Cal. 609, 293 P. 40 (1930);
Sinnar v. Le Roy, 44 Wash. 2d 728, 270 P.2d 800 (1954).
"It has not seemed satisfactory to some able and just minds that courts
should hold that where parties to a contract are in pari delicto they will leave
the delinquents where they find them, because such a rule permits one to
plead his own wrong or infamy . . . and thereby obtain an unconscionable
advantage over his adversary .... Courts, however, are not called upon to
settle any question of conscience between the parties, but are interested only
in the higher duty of protecting society .... While, therefore, the defense
advanced may be one which ill lies in the mouth of defendant to assert,
nevertheless, if public policy requires it, the plea will be permitted even if
it allows one to retain an advantage without rendering the stipulated return."
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 71 Cal. App. 492, 495, 236 P. 210, 212
(1925).
23 Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 2d 528, 297 P.2d 961 (1956) (no estoppel to
plead illegality); Davis v. Chipman, 210 Cal. 609, 293 P. 40 (1930) (ratifying
conduct could not bar defendant's plea of illegality); Colby v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co., 160 Cal. 632, 117 P. 913 (1911) (estoppel and laches applied to defeat
other grounds for rescission of the contract, but not to the plea of illegality).
24 Kennerson v. Salih Bros., 123 Cal. App. 2d 371, 266 P.2d 871 (1954).
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issue will be investigated and decided on the court's own motion, even
though neither party intended to raise the issue.25
There are, however, several exceptions to the general rule of
unenforceability of claims arising out of illegal transactions. For the
most part, these exceptions are restitutionary in nature: they in-
volve a restoring to the plaintiff of benefits acquired by the defendant
and which are being unjustly retained by him at the plaintiff's loss. 26
Even though the bargain was illegal and void, the plaintiff will be
allowed restitution, if he can offer the court a sound reason for cir-
cumventing the general rule of unenforceability 2 7 The following dis-
cussion is intended to classify and interpret these reasons.
Plaintiff Not In Pari Delico 28
Where the general rule is applied and a contract is held void and
unenforceable for illegality, one of the reasons generally assigned is
that courts will not lend their aid to a party in pari delicto (in equal
fault).29 The plaintiff's unlawful purposes or moral turpitude de-
prive him of any right to assert his claim in court.30  It follows
that the plaintiff can avoid the usual result, and thus enforce his
claim, by establishing that he was not in pari delicto with the de-
fendant.
3 '
Some courts, misled by the literal meaning of the Latin phrase
"in pari delicto," have concluded that the plaintiff's guilt need only
be less than the defendant's to bring the case within this exception.3 2
In California, however, the supreme court has clearly repudiated that
interpretation by holding that the plaintiff must allege and prove
his fault to be slight compared to the defendant's. 33 The plaintiff
will then be allowed restitution of money, goods, reasonable value
of services, or any other thing of value transferred pursuant to the
agreement,34 although the defendant may be allowed to offset dam-
25 Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. Standard Am. Dredging Co., 184 Cal.
21, 24, 192 P. 847, 848-49 (1920); Greene v. Brooks, 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 45
Cal. Rptr. 99 (1965) (raised on appeal for first time); Cain v. Burns, 131 Cal.
App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955). But see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 600
(1932), which implies that the court cannot raise the issue on its own motion
when the contract is not prohibited by statute and no serious moral turpitude
is involved.
26 See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 598-609 (1932).
27 Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions,
95 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 261 (1947).
23 See generally CAL. Cxv. CODE § 1689 (b) (5) ; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 604 (1932).
29 E.g., Bank of Orland v. Harlan, 188 Cal. 413, 206 P. 75 (1922); Hooper
v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947).
80 Lee On v. Long, 37 Cal. 2d 499, 234 P.2d 9 (1951); Abbe v. Mar, 14
Cal. 210 (1859).
3' Cain v. Burns, 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955).
32 Id. at 444, 280 P.2d at 891.
3 Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561, 569, 177 P.2d 4, 8-9
(1947).
34 Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 46 Cal. 2d 450, 296 P.2d 554
(1956).
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ages sustained by him through the plaintiff's avoidance of the con-
tract.3 5
Grounds for alleging slight fault will vary with the facts of each
case, but some circumstances bringing the plaintiff within this ex-
ception are well-recognized and frequently encountered.
Justifiable Ignorance
6
As stated by a California District Court of Appeal:
Where the illegality is due to facts of which one party is justifiably
ignorant and the other party is not, the illegality does not bar re-
covery by the innocent party of compensation for performance ren-
dered while he remains justifiably ignorant of the facts establishing
illegality.3 7
In this case, one partnership sued another partnership for a
share of commissions earned by both in the sale of certain real es-
tate. The plaintiffs were duly licensed real estate brokers, but the
defendants were not. Thus, part of the performance of the contract
to find a buyer for the property was unlawful because contrary to
express law, making the companion agreement to share commissions
illegal. The defendants had told the plaintiffs that they were prop-
erly licensed as a partnership. This misrepresentation would not es-
top the defendants to plead the illegality.38 Nevertheless, judgment
for the plaintiffs was affirmed, because they did not know that the
defendants were unlicensed, and their ignorance of this illegality was
justified by the defendants' misrepresentation.39
In Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co.,40 a plaintiff who was
justifiably ignorant of the facts establishing illegality was allowed
restitution of the consideration paid, even though the contract was
wholly executed on both sides. The plaintiff had sold the defendant
corporation some shares of stock in the defendant and now sought
their return. The price of the stock had been paid out of earned
surplus in violation of a statute. The court held that, although the
seller was chargeable with knowledge of the statute prohibiting the
transaction, it was reversible error for the lower court to sustain the
defendant's demurrer, since the seller had alleged ignorance of the
money's source, as well as reliance upon the defendant to comply with
the statute.41 The court indicated that, if these allegations were
35 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1691; City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal. 2d
267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959); cf. People ex rel. Mosk v. Barenfeld, 203 Cal. App.
2d 166, 21 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962).
36 See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 599 (1932).
37 Holland v. Morgan & Peacock Properties Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 206, 210,
335 P.2d 769, 772 (1959); accord, Nevcal Enterprises, Inc. v. Cal-Neva Lodge,
Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 799, 32 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1963).
38 Holland v. Morgan & Peacock Properties Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 206, 211,
335 P.2d 769, 772 (1959).
39 Id.; accord, National Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U.S. 423 (1903)
(plaintiff's ignorance of illegality justified by defendant's misrepresentation
of fact); Nevcal Enterprises, Inc. v. Cal-Neva Lodge, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 799,
32 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1963) (alternative holding) (ignorance of invalidating law
of another state justified by defendant's misrepresentation).
40 46 Cal. 2d 450, 296 P.2d 554 (1956).
41 Id. at 454-55, 296 P.2d at 556-57.
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true, the plaintiff seller would not be in pari delicto and should be
given relief from the illegal transaction, that is, return of the stock
certificates.
42
On retrial, however, the plaintiff in the Tiedje case would un-
doubtedly have to return the money he received for transfer of the
stock as a condition precedent to restoration of the shares.
43
In Brashears v. Giannini,44 the purpose of the contract, buying
wine for sacramental uses, was lawful under the prohibition statute,
but the contract was nevertheless illegal because the plaintiff buyer
did not intend to obtain a required permit.45 The plaintiff did not
know that a permit was required and brought suit for rescission.
The court intimated that this ignorance of law, as distinguished from
ignorance of fact, permitted the court to circumvent the general rule
of unenforceability and to award the plaintiff restitution of the pur-
chase price.46 However, the decision cannot be given much weight on
this issue, because the case clearly falls within another exception to
the general rule-namely, repudiation before unlawful perform-
ance.47 At the time the plaintiff instituted his suit for rescission, no
wine had been delivered under the contract.
48
California courts generally state the rule concerning ignorance
of the illegality in terms of ignorance of fact, not of law. 49 Other
jurisdictions hold the plaintiff to be in pari delicto, even though he
lacks knowledge of the invalidating law.50 Apparently, in Califor-
nia, the plaintiff's ignorance of the law will not bring his case
within this exception to the general rule of unenforceability of
claims arising out of illegal transactions.51
Members of the Class an Invalidating Statute Was Designed to
Proect52
When a statute or ordinance declares expressly or impliedly that
a particular activity is unlawful and the contract sued upon includes
the prohibited activity, the contract may or may not be illegal.53 The
determinative question, in any such case, is whether the statute was
designed to protect the public from an abuse.54  For example, a
42 Id. at 455, 296 P.2d at 557.
43 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1691; City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52
Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959); cf. People ex rel. Mosk v. Barenfeld, 203 Cal.
App. 2d 166, 21 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962).
44 131 Cal. App. 706, 22 P.2d 47 (1933).
45 Id. at 708-09, 22 P.2d at 48.
46 Id. at 713, 22 P.2d at 50.
47 Text accompanying notes 82-92 infra.
48 Brashears v. Giannini, 131 Cal. App. 706, 711, 22 P.2d 47, 49 (1933).
49 Cases cited note 37 supra and accompanying text.
50 McFall v. Arkoosh, 37 Idaho 243, 215 P. 978 (1923); Gloyd v. Hotel La
Salle Co., 221 Ill. App. 104 (1921).
51 See Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 46 Cal. 2d 450, 454-55, 296
P.2d 554, 556-57 (1956).
52 See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 601 (1932).
53 Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949); Wood
v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 143 P. 691 (1914).
54 Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 143 P. 691 (1914); Houston v. Williams,
53 Cal. App. 267, 200 P. 55 (1921).
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licensing statute implies (if not plainly expressed) that doing the
defined acts without a license is unlawful; therefore, an agreement
to perform such acts without a license is illegal.55 However, if the
purpose of the statute is merely to collect revenue, courts are in-
clined to leave enforcement of the statute to criminal or adminis-
trative proceedings, and generally do not impose the additional pen-
alty of the forfeiture resulting from nonenforcement of illegal con-
tracts.56 On the other hand, if the licensing statute is designed to
protect the public against unqualified or irresponsible persons, the
illegality of the contract renders all claims arising out of it unenforce-
able, in law and in equity.
57
Suppose, however, the party seeking relief is a member of the
class the invalidating statute was designed to protect. Manifestly,
to deny recovery would defeat the legislative purpose by imposing a
forfeiture upon the party who was supposed to benefit by the
statute.58 The statute implies that this plaintiff is not in pari delicto,
but is the innocent victim of a wrong.59
As indicated at the beginning of this comment,60 some contracts
are illegal not because the performance or purpose of the contract is
unlawful, but because the form or substance of the contract itself is
specifically made illegal by statute.61 Even in such cases, if the
plaintiff can prove the purpose to be his protection as a class mem-
ber, rescission and restitution will be allowed,6 2 although the court
may, in its discretion, require the rescinding party to make restitu-
tion to the defendant before relief will be granted.
6 3
A good example of most of the principles discussed under this
subheading is City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey.64 In this case, a
car dealer sued to recover the deficiency on the resale of an auto-
mobile after the buyer's default on payments under a conditional
sales contract. The buyer filed a cross-complaint for restitution of
money already paid by him under the agreement. The contract, when
signed by the buyer, contained neither a time-price differential nor a
contract balance, both required by statute. The California Supreme
55 Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal. App. 2d 332, 67 P.2d 114 (1937); Firpo v.
Murphy, 72 Cal. App. 249, 236 P. 968 (1925).
56 Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 387, 143 P. 691, 692 (1914).
57 Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947); Firpo v.
Murphy, 72 Cal. App. 249, 236 P. 968 (1925); Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal.
App. 267, 200 P. 55 (1921).
58 Stenger v. Anderson, 66 A.C. 1024, 429 P.2d 164 (1967); McAllister v.
Drapeau, 14 Cal. 2d 102, 92 P.2d 911 (1939); Smith v. Turner, 238 Cal. App.
2d 141, 47 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1965); Lund v. Cooper, 159 Cal. App. 2d 349, 324
P.2d 62 (1958).
59 See Dias v. Houston, 154 Cal. App. 2d 279, 315 P.2d 885 (1957) (judg-
ment for breach of contract against unlicensed building contractor); Cain v.
Burns, 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955) (where statutory penalty is
imposed upon only one party, other party is a member of class protected and
not in pari delicto).
60 Text accompanying note 12 supra.
61 Cases cited note 12 supra.
62 Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949).
63 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1691; cf. People ex rel. Mosk v. Barenfeld, 203
Cal. App. 2d 166, 21 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962).
64 52 Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
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Court construed the statutory requirements as mandatory, thus mak-
ing the contract illegal and unenforceable. 65 However, a judgment for
the buyer on the cross-complaint was affirmed.6 The statute was
designed for the buyer's benefit and protection.67 Therefore, he was
not in pari delicto and could recover installments paid plus the
market value of his trade-in. 6 On the other hand, it was proper
for the lower court to allow the seller a setoff against the buyer for
depreciation of the car's value, in order to achieve a more just
result between the parties.69
Oiher Cases70
Besides justifiable ignorance and qualifying as a member of the
class the invalidating statute was designed to protect, other circum-
stances may persuade the court that the plaintiff is not in pari delicto.
For instance, duress, menace, or undue influence practiced by the de-
fendant to force the plaintiff into an illegal bargain will indicate
that the plaintiff's fault was slight. Under such circumstances, the
plaintiff will be given the aid of the court to set aside or avoid the




The California Civil Code, section 1608, provides:
If any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or
of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the entire
contract is void.
7 3
Upon first reading this statute, one may conclude that a contract
is void and unenforceable if any part of the transaction is unlawful.
However, in Keene v. Haring74 the California Supreme Court con-
strued the term "single consideration" to mean "indivisible considera-
tion."75 The statute, therefore, states the result in cases of partial
illegality only when the court determines the contract to be non-
severable. If the contract is severable, the legal part will be en-
forced and the illegal part disregarded.7 6
65 Id. at 272-73, 339 P.2d at 855.
66 Id. at 277, 339 P.2d at 858.
67 Id. at 272-73, 339 P.2d at 855.
68 Id. at 274-75, 339 P.2d at 856-57.
69 Id. at 275-77, 339 P.2d at 857-58.
7o See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 604 (1932).
71 Stenger v. Anderson, 66 A.C. 1024, 429 P.2d 164 (1967) (undue influ-
ence upon elderly person by relatives); McAllister v. Drapeau, 14 Cal. 2d 102,
92 P.2d 911 (1939) (economic pressure); Colby v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 160
Cal. 632, 117 P. 913 (1911) (threat to prosecute plaintiff's daughter for
embezzlement).
72 See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 606, 607 (1932).
73 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1608.
74 61 Cal. 2d 318, 392 P.2d 273, 38 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1964).
75 Id. at 324, 392 P.2d at 277-78, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18. This interpre-
tation seems reasonable in light of CAL. Civ. CoDs § 1599, which provides:
"Where a contract has several distinct objects, of which one at least is lawful,
and one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to
the latter and valid as to the rest."
76 Keene v. Harling, 61 Cal. 2d 318, 392 P.2d 273, 38 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1964);
accord, Ulene v. Jacobson, 209 Cal. App. 2d 139, 26 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1962).
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The Keene case also states the test to determine severability:
"[A] contract is severable if the court can, consistent with the intent
of the parties, reasonably relate the illegal consideration on one side
to some specified or determinable portion of the consideration on
the other side.
'77
Thus, the court held that, where the contract recited a total
price for the transfer of a going business and several coin-operated
machines, and the sale of some of the machines was a criminal of-
fense, the plaintiff seller was entitled to judgment for the purchase
price minus the value of the illegal machines.7 8 The court could
determine what portion of the contract price reasonably related to
the illegal machines, because their market value was published in a
trade magazine .
7
In a 1920 California Supreme Court case, 0 a payee obtained judg-
ment on several promissory notes, even though evidence at the trial
disclosed that part of the consideration for the notes was in restraint
of trade, therefore unlawful. The court held the contract divisible,
because the money consideration was apportioned among the several
performances to be rendered, thus permitting enforcement of the
legal part of the bargain."
Repudiation Before Unlawful Performance 2
"[W] here money has been paid in consideration of an executory
contract which is illegal, the party who has paid it may repudiate the
agreement at any time before it is executed and reclaim the money."
83
Accordingly, where a vendor agreed to sell land by reference to an
unrecorded map, a procedure made unlawful by statute, the con-
tract was illegal and unenforceable.8 4 Yet, the buyer was allowed to
77 Keene v. Harling, 61 Cal. 2d 318, 321, 392 P.2d 273, 275, 38 Cal. Rptr.
513, 515 (1964).
78 Id. at 322-24, 392 P.2d at 276-78, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 516-18.
79 Id. at 322-23, 392 P.2d at 277, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 517. The Keene case
expressly overruled, at 323 n.2, 392 P.2d at 277 n.2, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 517 n.2,
the test of divisibility used in a prior appellate court case. The overruled
decision had held a contract indivisible because a single sum had been prom-
ised for a variety of items. Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp., 226 Cal. App. 2d 71, 37
Cal. Rptr. 794 (1964). Keene also impliedly overruled prior interpretations
of section 1608 of the Civil Code. Keene v. Harling, 61 Cal. 2d 318, 324, 392
P.2d 273, 277-78, 38 Cal. Rptr. 513, 517-18 (1964). For example, a 1951 dis-
trict court of appeal case had held a contract entirely void because part of
the consideration moving to the plaintiff was unlawful, and the court had
responded to the plaintiff's claim of severability by merely quoting section
1608. Fong v. Miller, 105 Cal. App. 2d 411, 414, 233 P.2d 606, 607 (1951).
Dodging the issue of severability in this manner is clearly contrary to the
Keene decision.
80 Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. Standard Am. Dredging Co., 184 Cal.
21, 192 P. 847 (1920).
81 Id.
82 See generally CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1689, 1691, 1692; RESTATEMENT Or CON-
TRACTS § 605 (1932).
83 Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 263, 191 P. 14, 15 (1920); accord, Green
v. Frahm, 176 Cal. 259, 168 P. 114 (1917); Brashears v. Giannini, 131 Cal. App.
706, 22 P.2d 47 (1933).
84 Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 261-62, 191 P. 14, 14-15 (1920).
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repudiate the contract, before title passed, and to obtain restitution
of that portion of the purchase price already paid.8 5
It is not necessary that the contract remain entirely executory.8 6
As long as the illegal portion has not been executed or has been
abandoned, the plaintiff can repudiate the agreement and enforce any
claims he may have in restitution. Thus, a lessee, who had been in
possession for several months, was awarded restitution of a $3,000
deposit made to secure rent payments, even though the purpose of
the lease was to conduct a house of prostitution.87 The court held
that the unlawful purpose did not render the lessee's cause of action
void.8 The decision rested upon the court's finding of an abandon-
ment of the original plan, since the premises were never in fact used
for prostitution.8 9
Contrary to the general statement of this exception,90 one Cal-
ifornia case indicated that a plaintiff may repudiate an illegal agree-
ment, and recover the consideration paid, even after the unlawful
performance has begun. The plaintiff had leased a house to the de-
fendant on the latter's promise to cohabit with her as husband and
wife, though neither contemplated marriage. The lessor brought suit
to quiet title, and although the complaint itself disclosed the unlaw-
ful consideration, she was allowed to repudiate the agreement and
cancel the illegal lease.91 The lessee contended on appeal that this
exception to the general rule should not be applied if, as he alleged,
the unlawful cohabitation actually commenced. But the appellate
court held the lessee's allegation to be immaterial upon the ground
that the unlawfulness in this case was a continuing relationship be-
tween the parties, thus permitting rescission and restitution at any
time.92
Terminated Transactions
The fact that an illegal transaction is terminated is becoming an
important element in persuading California courts not to apply the
general rule of unenforceability of claims arising out of illegal bar-
gains. 93 This is not an absolute exception to the general rule, as
were the exceptions discussed above, but is a persuasive factor which
the court will balance against other facts in the case.94 The following
discussion will analyze the reasons supporting this exception and
the circumstances which prevent its application.
85 Id. at 263-64, 191 P. at 15.
86 Green v. Frahm, 176 Cal. 259, 168 P. 114 (1917).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 264, 168 P. at 116.
89 Id.
90 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 605 (1932).
91 Glos v. McBride, 47 Cal. App. 688, 191 P. 67 (1920).
92 Id. at 690-91, 191 P. at 67-68.
93 See, e.g., Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 414, 322 P.2d 548 (1958);
Wagner v. Worrell, 76 Cal. App. 2d 172, 172 P.2d 751 (1946); Denning v.
Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 160 P.2d 900 (1945).
94 Compare Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949),
with Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957),
and Greene v. Brooks, 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 45 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1965).
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The leading case on the subject is Norwood v. Judd,95 a suit for
the dissolution of a partnership and an accounting. A statute re-
quired that each partner should be licensed individually and that
the partnership business should be separately licensed. The de-
fendant had an individual license, but neither the plaintiff nor the
partnership was licensed. The plaintiff had served as bookkeeper
for the firm, and could have qualified for a license had he applied,
while the defendant acted as general manager. The partnership
agreement was illegal, because performance under it was contrary
to the licensing statute.0 6 Nevertheless, the court ordered an ac-
counting between the parties for the following reason:
Where, by applying the rule [of unenforceability of claims arising
out of illegal transactions], the public cannot be protected because
the transaction has been completed, where no serious moral turpitude
is involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest
moral fault, and where to apply the rule will be to permit the de-
fendant to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the
rule should not be applied.
9 7
The distinctive feature of this quotation is its emphasis upon
completed execution of the illegal contract. The court believed that,
where the unlawful activity is completed, the public can no longer
be protected by a refusal to enforce claims arising out of the bar-
gain, and if the reason for a rule fails, the rule should not be ap-
plied.9 8 The court understood the basic reason for general unen-
forceability to be the protection of the public from the harmful ef-
fects of the transaction in question. Although this view was not
without precedent,99 an examination of the cases holding claims unen-
forceable for illegality (rather than applying an exception) will re-
veal that the true purpose is to discourage future transactions of like
nature. °0 0 It is submitted that this proposition would destroy the
major premise of the court's argument; for if the parties know that
any claims they may have against each other are likely to be en-
forced once the illegal agreement has been executed, they are actually
encouraged to proceed with their unlawful plan.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached in Norwood
was advanced in Matchett v. Gould.'0 ' After reviewing Norwood
and several other unlicensed-partnership cases where accounting had
been ordered between the parties after termination, the court stated a
more general principle. The fact of partnership merely afforded a
"basis for application of the equitable concept that one person in
possession of property belonging to himself and another cannot deny
the claim of that other to his share because the property was acquired
in a transaction which was unlawful only because had without the
sanction of a licensing statute.' ' 0 2  To state the same principle in
95 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949).
90 Id. at 283, 209 P.2d at 28.
97 Id. at 289, 209 P.2d at 31.
98 Id. at 286-88, 209 P.2d at 30-31.
99 See Wagner v. Worrell, 76 Cal. App. 2d 172, 172 P.2d 751 (1946); John-
son v. Davidson, 54 Cal. App. 251, 202 P. 159 (1921).
100 Notes 15 & 16 supra.
101 131 Cal. App. 2d 821, 281 P.2d 524 (1955), overruled by Lewis & Queen
v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 154, 308 P.2d 713, 721 (1957).
102 Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal. App. 2d 821, 826, 281 P.2d 524, 527 (1955).
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another way, if the defendant will be unjustly enriched unless the
plaintiff is awarded restitution of what rightfully belongs to him, the
illegality of the bargain will not prevent recovery, as long as the
unlawfulness is not a serious matter. This interpretation is mani-
festly contrary to settled law.10 3 If carried to its logical conclusion,
this principle would permit any party to an illegal bargain to enforce
claims arising out of it merely by suing in restitution and claiming
that he is not seeking to enforce the contract, but is praying for
restoration of the status quo as it existed before the contract was
formed. It should also be noted that Matchett was disapproved by
the California Supreme Court.'
0
Although some courts have held the terminated-transactions ex-
ception, as expressed in Norwood, to be applicable only to partner-
ship-dissolution cases, 10 5 and although its most frequent application
occurs in settling accounts between partners, the recent trend has
been to apply this exception to any case where an illegal transaction
has been terminated.0 6 In view of the significance of the Norwood
case, the principle there stated will be divided into its component
parts and analyzed in the light of both prior and subsequent deci-
sions.
As stated by Norwood, the general rule of unenforceability will
be circumvented when four conditions are present: (1) the illegal
transaction must be fully terminated, that is, the unlawful perform-
ance or purpose must have ceased or been abandoned; (2) the plain-
tiff's moral fault must be less than the defendant's; (3) the denial
of relief would unjustly enrich the defendant at the plaintiffs ex-
pense; (4) the illegality must not involve serious moral turpitude.'
0 7
Termination
What constitutes termination? Norwood used the word "com-
pleted," which tends to denote not only the cessation of activity, but
also full realization of purpose or plan. 0 8 Subsequent cases indicate
that this word was not so interpreted but was given the more neutral
meaning of "ended" or "ceased," regardless of fulfillment.10 9 If the
reason supporting this exception, namely, that the public can no
longer be protected, is at least partially valid, that reason applies
whenever activity under the bargain terminates, whether or not
the intended purpose or plan was completed. It is submitted, ac-
103 Cases cited notes 20 & 21 supra.
104 Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 154, 308 P.2d 713,
721 (1957).
105 See, e.g., Kennerson v. Salih Bros., 123 Cal. App. 2d 371, 266 P.2d 871
(1954).
106 See Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 219-20, 404 P.2d 486,
498-99, 45 Cal. Rptr. 878, 890-91 (1965); Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d
414, 322 P.2d 548 (1958); Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. App. 2d 472, 267 P.2d 59
(1954) (alternative holding).
107 Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 289, 209 P.2d 24, 31 (1949),
quoted in text accompanying note 97 supra.
108 WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 546 (2d ed. 1956).
109 See Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Constr. Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 584,
5 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1960).
1154 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VOL nb
cordingly, that the word "terminated" more accurately expresses the
stage which the bargain must have reached."10
Termination of transactions, within the meaning of this excep-
tion, occurs whenever the parties are no longer performing their
promises, no matter what the reason."' Thus, if the suit is for dis-
solution of a partnership, the forcible ejectment of one party from
the business premises will terminate the partnership agreement," 2
as will a wholly voluntary understanding between the parties that
they no longer desire to do business together."13  If the suit is
for the reasonable value of services rendered under an oral contract,
the transaction is terminated when the plaintiff has performed and
the defendant refuses to pay as agreed."14 On the other hand, if
one partner in an unlicensed partnership, which is continuing to do
business, refuses to share a particular commission, a copartner can-
not enforce his claim, 1 5 because the parties are still performing un-
der the illegal agreement which gave rise to the duty to share com-
missions.1 6
Given a terminated transaction, what circumstances balanced
against this factor will tend to persuade the court to deny relief
despite the termination?
Relative Fault
The plaintiff's moral fault must be less than the defendant's.
If not, the court may deny relief, despite the fact of termination.
17
For example, in Hooper v. Barranti,"18 which was approved by
Norwood,"19 the plaintiff and the defendant were partners in an
on-sale liquor business. Neither the defendant nor the partnership
was properly licensed. The plaintiff forcibly ejected the defendant
and then brought suit for dissolution and an accounting. Neither
party was allowed recovery upon the legal partnership agreement.
20
Three of the facts which distinguish this case from Norwood are
as follows: (1) the defendant was an alien and therefore unquali-
fied for a license; (2) the defendant actually sold liquor at the
bar, precisely what the statute attempted to prevent (in Norwood,
110 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERATIONAL DICTIONARY 2605 (2d ed. 1956).
111 Compare Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 160 P.2d 900 (1945),
with Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 414, 322 P.2d 548 (1958), and Nichols
v. Boswell-Alliance Constr. Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546
(1960).
112 Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947).
113 Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 160 P.2d 900 (1945).
"14 Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 414, 322 P.2d 548 (1958). See also
Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 216-21, 404 P.2d 486, 496-99, 45
Cal. Rptr. 878, 888-91 (1965).
115 Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal. App. 765, 242 P. 90 (1925).
116 Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 259-60, 160 P.2d 900, 903
(1945).
117 Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 289, 209 P.2d 24, 31 (1949),
quoted in text accompanying note 97 supra.
118 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947).
119 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 289-90, 209 P.2d 24, 31-32 (1949).
120 Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 577-79, 184 P.2d 688, 692-94
(1947).
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the plaintiff merely acted as bookkeeper); and (3) operating with-
out a proper license was one of the terms of the agreement, not
merely the result of negligence or oversight. 121 In short, the plaintiff
had no excuse for his failure to procure a partnership license; he
knew he could not obtain one and purposely violated the statute as
part of the planned bargain. The parties were equally blame-
worthy in this respect, and neither was awarded an accounting.'
22
As a word of caution, however, the requirement that the plaintiff
be in less fault than the defendant must be distinguished from the
previously discussed exception in cases where the plaintiff is not
in paTi delicto. It was there emphasized that the plaintiff must
be no more than slightly at fault; if he is, he can recover as com-
ing within an absolute exception to the general rule of unenforce-
ability of claims arising out of illegal transfers.12 3  Here, however,
the plaintiff's fault need only be less than the defendant's.
1 24
An excellent example of this aspect of the problem is Tri-Q,
Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp. 125 This case involved a complicated fact situation
with several parties, but one portion of the case is directly in point.120
The plaintiff corporation had agreed to buy some stock from the
defendant. The contract was illegal because its purpose was to give
both parties improper tax advantages in fraud of both federal and
state governments.1'2 7 The seller had delivered the stock, and the
buyer had paid part of the purchase price but refused to pay any
more. The buyer prayed for rescission, while the seller, in his
cross-complaint, demanded payment of the purchase price. Although
the seller was seeking direct enforcement of the terms of an illegal
contract, the court held in his favor. The parties had both intended
to defraud the government, which would normally make them in par
delicto, and the fault of neither could be considered slight.12 s But
in applying the terminated transactions exception, the court dis-
tinguished between primary and secondary purposes and concluded
that the seller's primary purpose was to sell the stock. 29 The
fraudulent aspect of the transaction was forced upon the seller by
the buyer, who was primarily interested in the improper tax advan-
tages. Therefore, the seller's fault was less than the buyer's, per-
mitting his recovery under this exception to the general rule.
130
121 Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 290, 209 P.2d 24, 32 (1949).
122 Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 577-79, 184 P.2d 688, 692-94
(1947).
123 Text accompanying note 32 supra.
124 See Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 217-21, 404 P.2d 486,
497-99, 45 Cal. Rptr. 878, 889-91 (1965).
125 63 Cal. 2d 199, 404 P.2d 486, 45 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1965).
126 Id. at 216-21, 404 P.2d at 496-99, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 888-91.
127 Id. at 218-20, 404 P.2d at 497-99, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 889-91.
128 Beard v. Beard, 65 Cal. 354, 4 P. 229 (1884), where the court general-
ized as follows: "[A] right of action cannot arise out of fraud, which applies
not only where the contract is expressly illegal, but whenever it is opposed to
public policy, or founded on an immoral consideration." Id. at 355-56, 4 P.
at 230.
129 Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 218-20, 404 P.2d 486, 497-99,
45 Cal. Rptr. 878, 889-91 (1965).
130 Id. at 220, 404 P.2d at 498-99, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
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It should be noted, however, that some cases, in applying the
terminated-transactions exception, seem not to require that the
plaintiff be in less fault than the defendant. 131 Other cases indicate
that the defendant's breach of contract may put him in greater moral
fault than the plaintiff, when the illegality is of a very minor nature. 3 2
Unjust Enrichment
Relief will be denied in cases of illegal contracts, despite the
fact of termination, if the denial will not leave the defendant
unjustly enriched.3 3 It is submitted that this proposition logically
follows from the basic dilemma faced by the courts in all illegal
contracts cases, that is, the impossibility of doing justice between the
parties and protecting the public from illegal transactions at the same
time. If no unjust enrichment would result from a refusal to enforce
the plaintiff's claim, there remains little reason to forego the public's
protection, and the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover.
In a 1966 district court of appeal case, 3 4 the plaintiff, a licensed
plumbing contractor, and the defendant, a licensed air-conditioning
contractor, had agreed to submit a joint bid for their respective
work on the construction of a building. Their bid was accepted
by the general contractor, and each separately contracted with him.
The defendant failed to install the air-conditioning equipment as
promised, resulting in $700 damages to the general contractor. To
cover this loss, the general contractor deducted $700 from the
plaintiff's compensation for the plumbing work, and the plaintiff
sued to be reimbursed upon the theory that the defendant had
breached the joint venture agreement. The licensing statute made
the contract illegal, because neither party to the joint venture was
licensed to do the other's work. 35 In refusing to apply the termi-
nated-transactions exception, the court stated: "[T]he Norwood case
turned on the issue of unjust enrichment; here, however, there was
no retention of money or benefits by the defendant.'
30
Absence of Serious Moral Turpitude 37
In Chateau v. Singla,138 the court refused to decree an accounting
after termination of a partnership business, the purpose of which was
the renting of apartments to prostitutes in contravention of a penal
statute. The partnership agreement was illegal because its purpose
'3' See Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 414, 322 P.2d 548 (1958).
132 See Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. App. 2d 472, 482, 267 P.2d 59, 66 (1954).
'33 Proffitt & Durnell Plumbing, Inc. v. David H. Baer Co., 247 Cal. App.
2d 518, 522, 55 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (1966); Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276,
289, 209 P.2d 24, 31 (1949), quoted in text accompanying note 97 supra. See
also Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Barton Dev. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 442, 49 Cal. Rptr.
667 (1966).
134 Proffitt & Durnell Plumbing, Inc. v. David H. Baer Co., 247 Cal. App.
2d 518, 55 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1966).
'35 Id. at 521, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66.
130 Id. at 522, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
137 Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 289, 209 P.2d 24, 31 (1949),
quoted in text accompanying note 97 supra.
138 114 Cal. 91, 45 P. 1015 (1896).
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was unlawful; therefore, the court refused to enforce any claims
arising out of the transaction, even though the partnership was
entirely terminated.139
Serious moral turpitude will usually be present when the agree-
ment is to perform acts mala in se (wrong in themselves, even in
the absence of penal law).140 However, serious moral turpitude may
be present even though no activity under the agreement is malum in
se. A contract may be illegal and unenforceable merely because its
performance or purpose is forbidden by statute or case law and not
otherwise wrong, that is, malum prohibitum.141 But the particular
manner in which such a law is violated can be so flagrant as to
involve serious moral turpitude. 42  In other words, serious moral
turpitude is not synonymous with malum in se. The latter is a
technical classification in the criminal law which divides crimes into
two categories based upon the court's interpretation of the general
moral conscience of the community. 43 A finding of serious moral
turpitude, on the other hand, while judged in light of the same stand-
ard, does not objectively classify defined conduct. To say that a
bargain involves serious moral turpitude is to say that the manner of
its performance, as well as the defined performance itself, taken
together are shocking to the moral conscience. 4 4 Thus, failure to
comply with a licensing statute, although always malum prohibitum,
may or may not involve serious moral turpitude.
Hooper v. Barranti45 has already been discussed in connection
with determining whether the plaintiff's fault is less than the de-
fendant's. 46 That case is also illustrative of serious moral turpitude.
Although the only illegality of the partnership agreement was
failure to procure a proper license, the manner of that failure was
flagrant. It was not a case of mere neglect; the parties had agreed,
at the outset, to conduct their liquor business in violation of law.
In addition, the party who could not qualify under the statute actively
managed the business and directly sold liquor to customers-precisely
what the statute was intended to prevent.147
139 Id. at 93-95, 45 P. at 1015-16.
140 "Acts mala in se include, in addition to all felonies, all breaches of
public order, injuries to person or property, outrages upon public decency or
good morals, and breaches of official duty, when done wilfully or corruptly.
Acts mala prohibita include any matter forbidden or commanded by statute,
but not otherwise wrong." Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 324
(1873).
141 Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262, 191 P. 14, 15 (1920).
142 Cf. Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 290, 209 P.2d 24, 32 (1949).
143 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 692-710 (1957). The difference between
acts mala in se and mala prohibita is not the difference between crimes at
common law and statutory crimes. The true distinction lies in whether the
act is morally wrong of itself, without reference to the criminal law. Thus,
an act is malum prohibitum if it is wrong only because prohibited by law,
either common law or statutory (for example, criminal nuisance). And an
act may be malum in se, even though it is only statutorily criminal (for ex-
ample, embezzlement), or even though the law provides no punishment for
the act at all (for example, suicide). Id. at 698-99, 703.
144 See Abbe v. Marr, 14 Cal. 210 (1859).
145 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1949).
146 Text accompanying notes 117-32 supra.
147 Id. at 572-73, 184 P.2d at 690 (1947).
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Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons148 is another leading case on
this subject. An unlicensed subcontractor sued the general contractor
for compensation for the use of equipment the plaintiff had rented to
the defendant during a construction project for a third party. The con-
tract was held illegal, and the defendant was awarded judgment,
even though the plaintiff thereby suffered a serious forfeiture.
149
The dissenting opinion of Justice Carter indicated the factual simi-
larity between this case and Norwood: "Two parties agreed to per-
form work for a third party and one of the two withheld the
other's share of the proceeds."'50 But the majority, without disap-
proving Norwood, held the law of that case inapplicable upon the
ground that the defendant general contractor was a member of the
class the licensing statute was designed to protect.151 The dissenting
opinion interpreted the statute differently, believing that general
contractors are so familiar with the quality of work and character
of their subcontractors that a licensing statute is not needed for their
protection. 52 However, it would seem that both opinions are con-
sistent with the following generalization: Where an invalidating
statute is designed to protect the defendant, the plaintiff's moral
fault is so serious that recovery will be denied, even though the
illegal transaction is terminated, leaving the defendant unjustly en-
riched.15
3
Summary of the Terminated-Transactions Exception
The fact of termination of the bargain weighs heavily in favor of
awarding the plaintiff restitution to avoid unjust enrichment of the
defendant, but the following factors will also be considered:
(1) the relative moral fault of the parties;
54
(2) whether the defendant will be unjustly enriched if the
plaintiff's claim is not enforced;1 55
(3) whether there was slight or flagrant violation of the law; 56
(4) whether the unlawfulness was in the nature of the enter-
prise itself, rather than, for example, failure to procure a business
license; 157
(5) whether the unlawful activity or purpose was included in
the terms of the contract or contemplated by the parties from the
148 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
140 Id. at 150-51, 308 P.2d at 719.
150 Id. at 157, 308 P.2d at 723.
15' Id. at 151-54, 308 P.2d at 719-21.
152 Id. at 158, 308 P.2d at 724.
153 See id. at 153, 158, 308 P.2d at 720-21, 724.
'54 Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 220-21, 404 P.2d 486, 498-99,
45 Cal. Rptr. 878, 890-91 (1965). But see Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d
414, 322 P.2d 548 (1958); Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. App. 2d 472, 267 P.2d 59
(1954).
'55 Compare Proffitt & Durnell Plumbing, Inc. v. David H. Baer Co., 247
Cal. App. 2d 518, 55 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1966), with Wold v. Luigi Consentino &
Sons, 109 Cal. App. 2d 854, 241 P.2d 1032 (1952).
156 See Greene v. Brooks, 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 45 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1965).
157 Compare Denning v. Tabor, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 160 P.2d 900 (1945),
with Chateau v. Singla, 114 Cal. 91, 45 P. 1015 (1896).
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outset;158
(6) whether the unlawful activity or purpose was wrong in itself
(malum in se) or merely wrong because prohibited by statute or
common law (malum prohibitum) ;159
(7) whether the parties could have performed the contract law-
fully had they desired to do so;160
(8) whether the conduct of the parties was precisely what the
invalidating statute was intended to prevent, for example, manage-
ment of a partnership by one who cannot qualify under a licensing
statute; 1 1
(9) whether the defendant is a member of the class the invali-
dating statute was designed to protect;
162
(10) whether, under peculiar circumstances, the granting of the
relief sought will actually tend to discourage such transactions.
63
With such a long list of "other circumstances" to be considered
with the fact of termination, it may seem doubtful that terminated
transactions truly constitute an exception to the general rule of un-
enforceability of claims arising out of illegal transactions. However,
there are many cases applying the reasoning of Norwoodl6 4 and
awarding restitution despite the illegality of the bargain., 65
Probably the best single-sentence expression of the law of this
line of cases is found in Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons: 166 "In
each such case, how the aims of policy can best be achieved depends
on the kind of illegality and the particular facts involved."' 67 To
state the same conclusion another way, each case is unique in some
respects, and the basic objectives of doing justice between the
parties on the one side, and protecting the public from illegal trans-
actions on the other, must always be kept in mind. 68
158 Compare Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949),
with Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947).
159 Compare Chateau v. Singla, 114 Cal. 91, 45 P. 1015 (1896), with Vick
v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 414, 322 P.2d 548 (1958).
160 Compare Greene v. Brooks, 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 45 Cal. Rptr. 99
(1965), with Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947).
161 Compare Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949),
with Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947).
162 Compare Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d
713 (1957), with Wold v. Luigi Consentino & Sons, 109 Cal. App. 2d 854, 241
P.2d 1032 (1952).
163 Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 220-21, 404 P.2d 486, 498-99,
45 Cal. Rptr. 878, 890-91 (1965).
164 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949).
165 Cases cited notes 154-56 supra.
166 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
167 Id. at 151, 308 P.2d at 719. See also Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Constr.
Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1960).
168 Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949), where the
following admonition appears: "The rule that courts will not lend their aid
to the enforcement of an illegal agreement or one against public policy is
fundamentally sound. The rule was conceived for the purposes of protecting
the public and the courts from imposition. It is a rule predicated upon sound
public policy. But the courts should not be so enamored with the Latin phrase
'in pari delicto' that they blindly extend the rule to every case where illegality
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Where the Forfeiture Would Be Disproportionately Large in
Light of the Unlawfulness Involved
Where application of the general rule of unenforceability of
claims arising out of illegal transactions would impose a serious for-
feiture upon the plaintiff, as balanced against the nature of the
illegality involved, California courts may allow recovery of damages
for breach of the contract or restitution of consideration paid. 169 In
determining whether the plaintiff can recover under this exception,
however, there are two other variables to be considered-namely,
whether the defendant pleads the illegality, and whether the particu-
lar language of an invalidating statute declares the contract to be
void and unenforceable.
170
Section 600 of the Restatement of Contracts expresses the rule
as follows:
If neither the consideration for a promise nor the performance of
the promise in an illegal bargain involves serious moral turpitude,
and the bargain is not prohibited by statute, it is enforceable unless
the plaintiff's case requires proof of facts showing the illegality, or
they are pleaded by the defendant, and even in that event recovery
may be allowed of anything that has been transferred under the bar-
gain, or its fair value, if necessary to prevent a harsh forfeiture. 171
Most of the decided cases on this issue have involved licensing
statutes, that is, the plaintiff was not licensed to perform the work
promised, thus rendering the contract illegal.172 A short analysis of
the language used in various statutes must be considered to avoid
confusion in comparing cases.
Some statutes merely prohibit the defined activity, unless a proper
license is procured, and impose administrative penalties, but do not
declare contracts made by unlicensed persons to be unenforceable.
173
In cases involving such statutes, if an unlicensed plaintiff obtains
judgment upon a contract in which he agreed to perform the defined
activity, an appellate court will not reverse the judgment if neither
party raised the issue of illegality at the trial. 174 This is contrary
to the general rule that courts have the power and duty to raise
an issue of illegality on their own motions whenever the evidence
of either party discloses the possibility that an unlawful performance
or purpose was involved..
7 5
appears somewhere in the transaction. The fundamental purpose of the rule
must always be kept in mind, and the realities of the situation must be con-
sidered." Id. at 288-89, 209 P.2d at 31.
169 Compare Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166
P.2d 265 (1946), with Bierman v. Hagstrom Constr. Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d
771, 1 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1959).
170 Compare Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d 162, 358 P.2d 918,
10 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1961), with Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d
141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
171 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 600 (1932).
172 Text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
173 E.g., CAL. AGICC. CODE §§ 56181, 56190 (cash-buyers of agricultural
products).
174 See Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d 162, 358 P.2d 918, 10
Cal. Rptr. 462 (1961).
175 See Greene v. Brooks, 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 168, 45 Cal. Rptr. 99, 103
(1965).
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Furthermore, even if the defendant does plead the illegality
as a defense, the court may award restitution to avoid a harsh for-
feitureY76 The fact that only administrative penalties were imposed
by the legislature gives the court an excuse for circumventing the
general rule of unenforceability, when serious forfeiture would other-
wise result.
177
Another class of licensing statutes imposes further sanctions by
providing that no person engaged in the defined activity can main-
tain an action for services rendered without first alleging and proving
that he was duly licensed at the time the cause of action arose 78
Under such a statute, a real estate broker may recover his commission
for selling real estate, although he was not licensed when the contract
was made, if he obtained a license before the listing agreement was
finally executed,179 or before the commission became due.180  The
legislature has fixed the time when the unenforceability of the illegal
contract shall attach, and courts will follow its direction,' even
though statutory prohibition of an activity normally renders a contract
involving such activity void and unenforceable from its inception.8 2
Finally, section 7031 of the California Business and Professions
Code imposes even further sanctions upon unlicensed building con-
tractors:
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a
contractor, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this
State for the collection of compensation for the performance of any
act or contract for which a license is required by this chapter without
alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all
times during the performance of such act or contract ... .183
The California Supreme Court has construed this section to
represent "a legislative determination that the importance of deterring
unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business out-
weighs any harshness between the parties, and that such deterrence
can best be realized by denying violators the right to maintain
any action for compensation in the courts of the state.' 8s 4  Never-
theless, a doctrine of "substantial compliance" has developed in an ef-
fort to apply the exception under discussion to contracts violative of
even this explicitly harsh licensing statute. 8 5 For example, an un-
licensed partnership can recover compensation for services rendered, if
the partners are individually licensed, 86 or if the partner or partners
176 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 600 (1932), quoted in text accompanying
note 171 supra; cf. Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564,
49 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966).
177 See Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 143 P. 691 (1914).
178 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10136 (real estate brokers and salesmen).
179 Radich v. Cernokus, 65 Cal. App. 452, 224 P. 124 (1924). See also
Fewel & Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal. 2d 85, 109 P.2d 650 (1941).
180 Brenneman v. Lane, 87 Cal. App. 414, 262 P. 400 (1927).
181 Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App. 267, 271, 200 P. 55, 56 (1921).
182 See, e.g., Cain v. Burns, 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955);
Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (Super Ct. 1954).
183 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031.
184 Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 151, 308 P.2d 713,
719 (1957).
185 Oddo v. Hedde, 101 Cal. App. 2d 375, 225 P.2d 929 (1950).
186 Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265
(1946).
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directly managing the work are licensed, even though others are
not. 8 7 The theory of recovery is that the purposes of the statute
have been substantially fulfilled. Therefore, the slight public
interest to be protected is outweighed by the forfeiture the plaintiffs
would suffer if the contract were not enforced. 8 8
In a recent California Supreme Court case,189 a corporation was
allowed to recover for excavation work although its contractor's
license had expired during the project and was not renewed for
almost a year. The court emphasized that the amount due was over
$400,000, substantially all the corporation's assets.190 Recovery was
allowed for three reasons:
(1) the fact that plaintiff held a valid license at the time of con-
tracting, (2) that plaintiff readily secured a renewal of that license
and (3) that the responsibility and competence of plaintiff's managing
officer was confirmed throughout the period of performance of the
contract.191
These factors amounted to "substantial compliance" with the
licensing statute, and the plaintiff could recover on the contract,
since otherwise the defendant would be unjustly enriched. 19 2
One may conclude that these cases are actually applying the
statute literally and are merely finding the contracts not to be il-
legal.193 However, in another recent case, an unlicensed corporation
doing business as a contractor, was denied recovery, even though its
sole shareholder and responsible managing officer was individually
licensed. 9 4 The action was for anticipatory breach of a contract to
construct a building. The court held the doctrine of "substantial
compliance" to be inapplicable, since the defendant was not unjustly
enriched.195 In other words, mere technical failure to comply with the
licensing statute rendered the contract void, and a court can allow
recovery under the doctrine of "substantial compliance" only to pre-
vent serious forfeiture.
Statutes which would make a contract illegal and unenforceable
are strictly construed to avoid that result when the moral delinquency
of the parties is not serious. 196 In construing this type of statute,
the fundamental legislative purpose must be kept in mind. In one
case,197 a real estate agent sued a developer for reasonable compen-
sation for selling a tract of houses. The exclusive employment agree-
187 Cf. Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 676 (1966).
188 Id. at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679: "If the facts clearly
indicate that the contractor has 'substantially' complied with the statute and
that such compliance has afforded to the obligor the protection contemplated
by the statute, we have rejected the obligor's attempt to escape liability."
189 Id. (4-3 decision).
'90 Id. at 280, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
191 Id. at 281-82, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
192 Id.
193 See Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265
(1946).
194 Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Barton Dev. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 442, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 667 (1966).
'9 Id. at 445, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
196 Oddo v. Hedde, 101 Cal. App. 2d 375, 225 P.2d 929 (1950).
197 Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. App. 2d 472, 267 P.2d 59 (1954).
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ment between the parties did not provide a specific date of final
and complete termination, as required by statute. An administrative
agency was given power to impose a penalty for a real estate broker's
violation of the statute. Yet, the illegality did not bar the broker's
recovery. 198 The statute prohibited the "practice" of making such
agreements. There was no evidence that the broker habitually made
the forbidden agreements, so the appellate court reversed the judg-
ment for the defendant. 9 9 The court concluded that, "If the law mak-
ing body had in mind that all contracts made in violation [of the
statute] should be void or voidable, it could have expressly so
provided .... ,,200
Finally, another application of this exception to the general rule
of unenforceabflity is found in cases where the invalidating statute
affects only a small part of the total transaction. Even where the
contract is not divisible (which would bring it under another excep-
tion to the general rule) ,201 the plaintiff will be awarded restitution
of the consideration transferred, because the unjust enrichment of
the defendant at the plaintiff's expense is a penalty too harsh in
light of the slight unlawfulness involved.
202
Stating the Cause of Action Without Revealing the
Illegality of the Bargain
Some courts have held that a plaintiff can recover upon a cause
of action arising out of an illegal transaction if he can establish his
claim without necessary reference to the illegality.20 3 If this is the
law, it is another exception to the general rule of unenforceability
of illegal contracts. It would permit plaintiff to recover whenever his
attorney has sufficient writing skill to plead a cause of action without
disclosing its illegal origin.
20 4
It is submitted, however, that this is not the law in California,
but a misapplication of another principle, which was stated as follows
in Hooper v. Barranti:
20 5
198 Id.
199 Id. at 478-80, 267 P.2d at 64-65.
200 Id. at 479, 267 P.2d at 65. This is an application of an exception to
the general rule of unenforceability of illegal contracts, and not a finding that
the contract was not illegal. Accord, Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Constr.
Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1960), where a vendor repudiated
a contract violative of the same statute before performance was completed.
The plaintiff real estate broker recovered compensation for the executed
portion of the contract, but could not enforce his claim for damages for the
anticipatory breach.
201 Text accompanying notes 72-81 supra.
202 Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp., 226 Cal. App. 2d 71, 37 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1964),
overruled on other grounds by Keene v. Harling, 61 Cal. 2d 318, 322-23, 392
P.2d 273, 276-77, 38 Cal. Rptr. 513, 516-17 (1964). But see Bierman v. Hag-
strom Constr. Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 771, 1 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1959).
203 Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 160 P.2d 900 (1945); C.I.T. Corp.
v. Breckenridge, 63 Cal. App. 2d 198, 146 P.2d 271 (1944).
204 Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through llegal Transactions,
95 U. PA. L. REv. 261, 262 (1947).
205 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.2d 688 (1947).
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The test whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction
is capable of being enforced is whether the plaintiff requires the aid
of the illegal transaction to establish his case. If the plaintiff cannot
establish his case without showing that he has broken the law, the
court will not assist him, whatever his claim in justice may be upon
the defendant.
2 06
The second sentence of the above quotation is an accurate state-
ment of the law,20 7 but its converse is not.20 8  In other words, the
test of whether the plaintiff can establish his claim without dis-
closing his own unlawful purposes or activities is applied to render
his cause of action unenforceable20 9 and his complaint void on its
face.21 0 This does not mean that the defendant's plea of illegality
will be disregarded merely because the plaintiff was able to allege





There are several cases, however, in which the court offers as an
alternative reason for its decision the fact that the plaintiff's claim
can be established without reliance upon the illegal contract.2 12 This
element of the case makes the illegality appear more remote and thus
helps to persuade the court that the general rule of unenforceability
should not be applied.213 Consequently, a plaintiff should not fail to
direct the court's attention to this circumstance, if it is present, even
though a recognized exception to the general rule clearly applies.
Conclusion
The purpose of this comment has been to label, define, and explain
exceptions to the general rule of unenforceability of claims arising
out of illegal transactions. The reader should not conclude that the
general rule is being consumed by the exceptions in California,
206 Id. at 576, 184 P.2d at 692.
207 Lee On v. Long, 37 Cal. 2d 499, 234 P.2d 9 (1951); Abbe v. Marr, 14
Cal. 210 (1859); Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal. App. 2d 332, 337, 67 P.2d 114, 117
(1937).
208 Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 2d 528, 297 P.2d 961 (1956); Franklin v.
Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal. 2d 628, 204 P.2d 37 (1949).
209 Lee On v. Long, 37 Cal. 2d 499, 234 P.2d 9 (1951); Holm v. Bramwell,
20 Cal. App. 2d 332, 337, 67 P.2d 114, 117 (1937).
210 Abbe v. Marr, 44 Cal. 210 (1859) (default judgment reversed).
211 Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 2d 528, 297 P.2d 961 (1956) (contract to
sell corporate stocks unlawfully issued); Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency,
33 Cal. 2d 628, 204 P.2d 37 (1949) (suit for judicial confirmation of an arbitra-
tion award).
It should also be noted that, when neither party intends to raise the issue
of illegality, the court has not only the power, but the duty, to raise and
decide the issue on its own motion if the evidence of either side discloses the
possibility of illegality in the bargain. Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. Stand-
ard Am. Dredging Co., 184 Cal. 21, 24, 192 P. 847, 848-49 (1920); Greene v.
Brooks, 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 168, 45 Cal. Rptr. 99, 103 (1965). To hold that
a plaintiff can recover whenever he can plead his cause of action without dis-
closing the illegal nature of the transaction would directly conflict with this
power and duty of the court. The two propositions are mutually exclusive.
212 See Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949); Denning
v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 160 P.2d 900 (1945).
213 See Boloyan v. Contente, 113 Cal. App. 2d 439, 248 P.2d 96 (1952).
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because: (1) there are numerous recent cases in which the validity of
the plaintiff's claim as between the parties is indisputable, but it is
held unenforceable for illegality, although the defendant is thereby
unjustly enriched;214 and (2) when the court does apply an exception
to the general rule, the argument always begins with the major
premise of unenforceability.
The California decisions have taken a liberal course and refuse
to follow blindly what would otherwise be a simple equation: ille-
gality=unenforceability. Each case is carefully scrutinized to find the
proper balance between public policy and individual justice. Which
interest will prevail in any given case ". . . depends on the kind
of illegality and the particular facts involved.1
215
William S. Hunter*
214 See, e.g., cases cited notes 14-21 supra.
215 Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 151, 308 P.2d 713,
719 (1957).
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